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"No, you're going to hear the truth-what you are and 
what I am! . . . The man don't know who we are! The man is 
gonna know! We never told the truth for ten minutes in this 
house!"' With these words to his parents and brother, Biff 
seeks to shatter the dual world in which he has lived for so 
long. The world of the Loman family consists of what actually 
occurs and the very different description of those occurrences. 
This duality masks not only their acts of infidelity and failure, 
but also their meritorious accomplishments. Ultimately, a 
destructive world full of confusion and delusion results. 
Like the duality in Arthur Miller's play, duality exists in 
the American Law Institute's Complex Litigation Recommenda- 
tions (hereinafter "Pr~posal").~ There is a distinct dichotomy in 
the Proposal's treatment of the abstention doctrines, on one 
page praising them and pledging allegiance to them, while on 
another trivializing and summarily dismissing them. Such split 
speech results, as it does in Arthur Miller's play, in confusion. 
Ultimately, the valuable benefits found in the principles of 
federalism underlying these doctrines may be lost. 
Federal court abstention is deeply rooted in American 
jurisprudence. Despite the supremacy of federal law and 
judgments in areas in which these are appropriate, federal 
courts are subject to significant statutory and common law 
restraints that are designed to preserve the jurisdiction and 
legitimacy of state courts as the guarantors of federal rights. 
These restraints have largely evolved through legislative and 
judicial reaction to concerns over comity and federalism. The 
jurisdiction sanctioned in Ex parte Young3 and Home 
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles4 was partly 
responsible for a major shift in the distribution of power 
between the states and the nation.' This shift did not go 
unnoticed by Congress or the federal courts! Congressional 
1. ARTKUR MILLER, DEATH OF A SALESMAN 130-31 (Viking Press 1949). 
2. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDA- 
TIONS AND ANALYSIS (1994) [hereinafter COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL]. 
3. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
4. Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 
(1913). 
5. PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1308 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]. 
6. Id. 
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response essentially was formulated in provisions of the 
Judicial Code which required federal abstention.? These 
"statutorily-dictated abstention[sIm8 are embodied in the Anti- 
Injunction Act,g the Tax Injunction Act of 1937," the Johnson 
Act of 1934," the since-modified Three-Judge Court Act,12 
and the exhaustion requirement in habeas corpus.13 
Federal deferral to state proceedings has not been achieved 
only by congressional action. The federal courts themselves 
have played an important role in limiting their own 
jurisdiction, not only in the realm sanctioned by Young and 
Home Telephone, but also more broadly in the areas of federal 
question and diversity jurisdiction. Although they have 
jurisdiction, the federal courts sometimes decline its exercise to 
allow for state court adjudication. This deferral is most widely 
observed in the federal common law abstention doctrines.'* 
This comment will address these abstention doctrines in the 
broad categories of Pullman abstention, Burford abstention, 
Colorado River abstention, and Younger abstention? While 
the varying policies and purposes underlying these various 
forms of abstention will be more closely examined in the body 
of this comment, it may be noted here that a unifylng thread of 
7 .  Id. 
8. Martin Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the 
Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 74 n.18 (1984). 
9. 28 U.S.C. $ 2283 (1982) (prohibiting a federal court from granting an 
injunction to stay proceedings in a state court "except as expressly authorized by 
Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or 
effectuate its judgments"). 
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982) (limiting federal district court jurisdiction to 
enjoin the assessment, levy, or collection of any tax under state law). 
11. 28 U.S.C. $ 1342 (1982) (limiting federal district court jurisdiction to 
enjoin state public utility rate orders). 
12. 28 U.S.C. $ 2284 (1982) (requiring that a district court panel of three 
judges be convened to hear actions seeking injunctive relief against allegedly 
unconstitutional state statutes or administrative orders). A 1913 provision, directing 
a three-judge federal district court panel to suspend its proceedings whenever a 
state court stayed proceedings pending state court determination of an action to 
enforce a statute or order, proved largely ineffectual and was repealed in 1976. See 
Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., Note, A Case for Three Judges, 47 HARV. L. REV. 795, 
813-25 (1934); Welch Pogue, Note, State Determination of State Law and the 
Judicial Code, 41 HARV. L. REV. 623 (1928). 
13. 28 U.S.C. $ 2254(b) (1982). 
14. Other exceptions to  the proper exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens, will not be addressed in this comment. 
15. See 17A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: 
C m  2d $ 4241 (1986). 
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deference by the federal courts to litigation in the state courts 
connects them all. 
After presenting an overview of abstention doctrines in the 
federal courts, this comment will turn to the Proposal and 
examine its impact, when considered as a whole, on existing 
abstention doctrines and the underlying principles of 
federalism. The Proposal provides for the consolidation in one 
transferee court of cases previously pending in federal or state 
courts whenever "they involve one or more common questions 
of fact" and when "transfer and consolidation will promote the 
just, efficient, and fair conduct of the actions."16 In so 
providing, the Proposal professes to respect the "overriding 
concern" of the "basic principles of federalism and their 
implications as to the respective roles of state and federal 
~ourts."'~ Additionally, the Proposal grants the federal trans- 
feree court the power to issue antisuit injunctions enjoining 
"transactionally related proceedings, or portions thereof, 
pending in any state or federal ~our t .~ ' ' ~  When deciding 
"whether an injunction should issue,"lg the comment to the 
Proposal encourages the transferee judge to "respect traditional 
notions of federalism, especially as reflected in the various 
abstention doctrines ."20 
This comment concludes that the Proposal, although 
superficially recognizing the importance of federalism concerns 
underlying the abstention doctrines, actually undermines these 
concerns through its emphasis on efficiency. 
A. The Underlying Premises 
When seeking to establish a system of government that 
would allow both federal and state sovereignties to coexist, the 
Founding Fathers naturally encountered concerns over possible 
frictions between federal and state systems.21 A significant 
area of concern was the judiciary.22 As Justice Black observed 
16. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, 8 3.01(a)(l), (2). 
17. Id. Ch. 1, b. 
18. Id. 8 5.04(a). 
19. Id. 8 5.04(b). 
20. Id. 8 5.04 cmt. d. 
21. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 98 US. 
281, 285 (1970). 
22. Id. 
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in Atlantic Coast Line, the Founders addressed those concerns 
by reserving significant powers to the States: 
When this Nation was established by the Constitution, each 
State surrendered only a part of its sovereign power to the 
national government. But those powers that were not surren- 
dered were retained by the States and unless a State was re- 
strained by "the supreme Law of the Land" as expressed in 
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, it was 
free to exercise those retained powers as it saw fit. One of the 
reserved powers was the maintenance of state judicial sys- 
tems for the decision of legal controversies." 
The federal government ensured the maintenance of state 
judicial systems as well as respect for such state systems 
through the Judiciary Act of 1789.~~ This Act prevented the 
lower federal courts from directly reviewing cases from state 
courts and authorized the Supreme Court to review the deci- 
sions of state courts on direct appeal. The beginnings of two 
essentially separate legal systems thus had their genesis early 
in this country's history. However, these two systems did not 
exist without difficulty and fiction. As litigants sought to sue 
in the system that most likely would be favorable to their 
cause, it became evident that the judiciary would function nei- 
ther efficiently nor effectively if the courts of both systems 
"were free to fight each other for control of a particular case. 
Thus, in order to make the dual system work and 'to prevent 
needless friction between state and federal courts,' . . . it was 
necessary to work out lines of demarcation between the two 
systems ."25 
Several of these "lines of demarcation" were enumerated in 
the 1789 Other lines were drawn through subsequent 
legislation. There are three principal statutorily-dictated limits 
which prevent the state and federal judicial systems from 
"fighting over" control of a particular case.27 These are briefly 
23. Id. 
24. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73. 
25. Atlantic Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 286 (quoting Oklahoma Packing Co. v. 
Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9 (1940)). 
26. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 24, 1789, $5 9, 11, 13, 1 Stat. 73. 
27. The statutory branch of the habeas corpus exhaustion requirement, 28 
U.S.C. $ 2254(b) (1982), and the Three-Judge Court Act, 28 U.S.C. $ 2284 (1982), 
will be omitted from this discussion as their relation to the instant topic is tangen- 
tial at best. 
966 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995 
treated here to provide a foundation for analysis of the judicial- 
ly created lines of demarcation. 
1. The Anti-Injunction Act 
The Anti-Injunction Act prohibits a federal court from 
granting "an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court 
except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where 
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its 
judgments."28 Commentators have argued that the true intent 
of this Act, originally passed in 1793 and broadly revised in 
1948, was to authorize sound judicial discretion in protecting 
the federal courts and the exercise of their subject matter juris- 
diction.29 However, the exceptions within the Anti-Injunction 
Act have been construed narrowly by the Supreme Court.30 
The Anti-Injunction Act was passed and revised on the 
assumption that duplicative federal and state proceedings are 
permi~sible.~' 'Staying proceedings," for the purposes of this 
Act, includes enforcing state judgments and enjoining litigants 
from proceeding in state court.32 Enjoining litigants from be- 
ginning state proceedings is not covered by the Act since no 
state "proceedings" then exist." 
28. 28 U.S.C. $ 2283 (1982). 
29. William T. Mayton, Ersatz Federalism Under the Anti-Injunction Statute, 
78 COLUM. L. REV. 330 (1978); see also Comment, Federal Court Stays of State 
Court Proceedings: A Reexamination of Original Congressional Intent, 38 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 612, 613 (1971) ("Congress in 1793 did not intend to prevent stays effected by 
writs other than injunction, and that Congress specifically approved the use of the 
[common-law] writ of certiorari to stay state proceedings."). This view of the Anti- 
Injunction Act seems to support the "implied delegation rationale" justifying the 
judicially-created abstention doctrines. See infh part II.B.5. 
30. See generally Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp, 486 U.S. 140, 148 (1987) 
(urging a strict and narrow interpretation); South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 
377 11.14 (1984); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 
U.S. 281, 287 (1970) (holding ban of injunctions is absolute unless the case falls 
within one of the three express exceptions); Alton Box Bd. Co. v. Esprit De Corp, 
682 F.2d 1267, 1272 (9th Cir. 1988); Comment, T m o  Inc. v. Pennzoil: Some 
Thoughts on the Limits of Federal Court Power Over State Court Proceedings, 54 
FORDHAM L. REV. 767, 796 (1986) (noting that the Younger court "overturned the 
federally issued injunction . . . without reaching the question of whether $ 1983 
was an expressly authorized exception to the Anti-Injunction Act"). 
31. Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U.S. 548, 554 (1877); see also Kline v. Burke 
Constr. Co., 260 US. 226, 230 (1922) (holding that "[elach court is free to proceed 
in its own way and in its own time, without reference to the proceedings in the 
other court"). 
32. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 US. 538, 555 (1972). 
33. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965); Ex parte Young, 209 
U.S. 123 (1908); Roth v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 583 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1978), 
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To fall within the Act's "expressly authorized" exception, 
an act of Congress either must explicitly authorize such an 
exception or create a federal right or remedy which cannot be 
enjoyed fully or protected completely without a stay of a state 
court proceeding." Federal civil rights cases, for example, 
meet the standard of the "expressly authorized exception"; 
similarly, 42 U.S.C. 8 1983 has been held to expressly autho- 
rize an injunction of state pro~eedings.~~ Thus the whole 
range of state criminal proceedings is, in theory, subject to a 
potential federal injunction, which in turn has led to the ten- 
dency to narrowly construe the various abstention doctrines in 
order to permit the state courts to proceed. 
The "protect or effectuate its judgments," or relitigation, 
exception authorizes a federal court which has already entered 
a binding judgment on an issue to enjoin state proceedings 
seeking an inconsistent result.36 Entitlement to an injunction 
under this exception turns on the preclusive effect of the feder- 
al decree.37 Issue preclusion triggers the relitigation exception. 
However, despite language in Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon 
carp. 38 urging a "strict and narrow'' interpretation applicable 
only to "claims or issues which . . . actually have been decided 
by the federal court,"39 there is a split of authority among the 
cert. dismissed, 442 U.S. 925 (1979); McSurely v. Ratliff, 282 F. Supp. 848, 853 
(E.D. Ky. 1967), appeal dismissed, 390 U.S. 412 (1968); cf. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 
U.S. 332, 347-48 (1975) (holding that where criminal defendants had been charged 
and contraband "had been declared to be obscene and seizable by the Superior 
Court," a federal order returning contraband seized in preparation for state crimi- 
nal prosecution "interfered with the pending criminal prosecution," which was con- 
sidered "pending" despite the fact that "no state criminal proceedings [had been 
brought] against appellees by name"); Brooks v. Briley, 274 F. Supp. 538, 553 
(M.D. Tenn. 19671, aff'd, 391 U.S. 361 (1968) (holding that arrest and issue of a 
warrant constitute "proceedings" and thus could be enjoined). 
34. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 236 (1972). 
35. Id. 
36. United States v. International Bd. of Teamsters, 907 F.2d 277, 280-81 (2d 
Cir. 1990) (affirming injunction barring collateral lawsuits by non-parties to consent 
decree in any other forum where such actions posed significant risk of subjecting 
consent decree to inconsistent interpretations); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. 
of Educ., 501 F.2d 383, 384 (4th Cir. 1974) (noting the possibility of conflicting 
orders from state and federal courts sufficient to warrant injunctive relief against 
state court under Anti-Injunction Act). 
37. Huguley v. General Motors Corp., 52 F.3d 1364, 1370 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(examining whether state claims fall within preclusive effect of prior federal judg- 
ment). 
38. 486 U.S. 140 (1988). 
39. Id. a t  148. 
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circuits as to whether claim preclusion also triggers the 
relitigation e~ception.~' 
The "necessary in aid of jurisdiction" exception applies 
when "some federal injunctive relief may be necessary to pre- 
vent a state court from so interfering with a federal court's 
consideration or disposition of a case as to seriously impair the 
federal court's flexibility and authority to decide that case."41 
There are several cases applying this exception to prevent 
interference with the settlement of complex l i t i g a t i ~ n . ~ ~  
2. The Johnson Act 
The Johnson Act of 1 9 3 4 ~ ~  prohibits federal district courts 
from enjoining state public utility rate orders if all four of the 
following criteria are satisfied: 
Jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship or 
repugnance of the order to the Federal Constitution; and, 
The order does not interfere with interstate commerce; 
and 
The order has been made aRer reasonable notice and 
hearing; and, 
A plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the 
courts of such State? 
3. The Tax Injunction Act 
Congress limited federal district court jurisdiction over a 
second major subject matter through the Tax Injunction Act of 
1937.~~ This legislation was enacted, as was the Johnson Act, 
in response to what was viewed as an unwarranted expansion 
of federal jurisdiction in the aftermath of Ex Parte Young.46 
This Act restricts federal district court jurisdiction to enjoin 
40. See Western Sys., Inc. v. Ulloa, 958 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1992) (discussing 
the differences between the circuits). 
41. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 
281, 295 (1970). 
42. See Carlough v. AMCHEM Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189, 204 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(finding injunction appropriate where prospect of settlement was imminent in as- 
bestos class action); Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 740 (9th Cir. 1987) (recognizing 
propriety of injunction "where the state proceedings would impair seriously pending 
settlements"). 
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982). 
44. Id. 
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). 
46. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at  1339. 
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"the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law" 
if "a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the 
courts of such State."" The key element prohibiting an injunc- 
tion under the Johnson Act and the Tax-Injunction Act is the 
availability of a plain, efficient, and speedy remedy in the state 
The Supreme Court has stated that the exceptions 
under the Tax Injunction Act "must [be] construed narrowly" 
and the Court will often bend over backwards to find state 
remedies adequate.4g 
B. The Judicial Abstention Doctrines and 
Their Underlying Policies 
I .  Pullman abstention 
The first of the judicially-created abstention doctrines was 
crafted by the Supreme Court in the Pullman case?' The com- 
plaint of the African-American Pullman porters alleged that an 
order from the Texas Railroad Commission requiring conduc- 
tors (who were white) to be in charge of sleeping cars discrimi- 
nated against African-Americans in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amend~nent .~~ The Supreme Court required the lower federal 
court to abstain from deciding the case until a state court set- 
tled uncertain state law issues.52 The basis for the decision 
was the policy of avoidance of unnecessary decisions of consti- 
tutional questions.53 Justice Frankfurter added that the "exer- 
cise of wise discretion" justified a restraint of authority "be- 
cause of 'scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of the 
state governments' and for the smooth working of the federal 
judiciary," and because 
[flew public interests have a higher claim upon the discretion 
of a federal chancellor than the avoidance of needless friction 
with state policies. . . . This use of equitable powers is a con- 
tribution of the courts in furthering the harmonious relation 
47. Id. 
48. Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951). 
49. California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 413 (1982); see 
Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503 (1981) (finding a state remedy ade- 
quate when plaintiff alleged property assessment at more than 300% the statutory 
limit and despite a usual two-year delay in tax refund actions). 
50. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). 
51. Id. at 497. 
52. Id. at 500. 
53. Id. at 498. 
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between state and federal authority without the need of rigor- 
ous congressional restriction of those powers.54 
While these federalism concerns were only briefly men- 
tioned in Pullman, the Supreme Court expounded upon them 
in Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of T h i b o d a ~ x . ~ ~  The 
Court "made explicit what was only suggested in Pullman, 
namely, that the one type of federal-state friction abstention 
seeks to avoid results from erroneous state law decisions by 
federal courts. Apparently, because state and federal litigants 
receive disparate treatment, such error creates friction by pre- 
venting uniform application of state law."56 
Thus was born the rule of Pullman abstention: when there 
is a federal constitutional issue whose presentation might be 
avoided or significantly altered5' by resolution of an uncertain 
state law question:8 the federal court should abstain.59 
2. Burford abstention 
Another form of abstention-Burford abstention-arose to 
address considerations of comity when issues of state law ap- 
54. Id. at  500-01 (citations omitted). 
55. 360 U.S. 25 (1959). 
56. James C. Rehnquist, Taking Comity Seriously: How to Neutralize the Ab- 
stention Doctrine, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1081 (1994) (citations omitted). 
57. Long Island Lighting Co. v. Cuomo, 666 F. Supp. 370, 401 (N.D.N.Y. 
1987) ("[Tlhe state law must be susceptible of an interpretation that . . . would 
materially alter the nature of the constitutional questions raised."). 
58. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439 (1971) (holding that the 
state statute must contain ambiguity). 
59. Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 468 (1987); Harman v. Forssenies, 380 
U.S. 528, 534-35 (1965). Subsequent cases also require an examination of other 
factors, such as whether injunctive relief is sought against state officials based on 
state law, see Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 
(1984), whether an adequate state remedy is available to the plaintiff, see 
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965), and whether a single state 
proceeding is likely to resolve the dispute, see Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 
378-79 (1964); see also Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 395 
(1988) (stating that if 'the state will decline to defend a statute if it is read one 
way and where the nature and substance of plaintiffs' constitutional challenge is 
drastically altered if the statute is read another way, it is essential [to have] the 
benefit of the law's authoritative construction from then state court); City of Hous- 
ton v. Hill, 482 US. 451 (1987), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 483 US. 1001 
(1987) (holding that abstention was not appropriate in a civil rights case where the 
need for immediate federal intervention existed). But see Georgevich v. Strauss, 772 
F.2d 1078, 1094 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1028 (1988) (holding that if 
full and effective relief can be granted by the state court, the "possibility of delay 
alone" does not prohibit abstention). 
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pear to be peculiar and unique, such as with natural resources, 
and when the state has created administrative schemes to deal 
with such issues.60 Burford was an action seeking a federal 
injunction against a Texas Railroad Commission order which 
granted a neighboring leaseholder a permit to drill new 
wells? Burford invoked both federal question and diversity 
jurisdi~tion.~~ Texas had provided that all cases involving 
drilling rights were to be handled by one state court in order to 
prevent inconsistencies and confusion.63 The Supreme Court 
held that the action should have been dismissed because of the 
presence of unique state interests in gas and oil, as well as a 
scheme of public administration equipped with a unified sys- 
tem of review to ensure consistent interpretation and imple- 
mentation of state policy.64 
Burford abstention in a diversity case involving uncertain 
state law and important state interests and policies is generally 
inappropriate unless the interests are peculiar and unique, 
such as eminent domain or water rights.65 New Orleans Public 
Service Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans66 (NOPSI) 
served to clarify this by holding that the focus in applying 
Burford abstention was to be on federalism concerns and that 
abstention should be ordered only when significant questions of 
local law or policy transcending the case at bar are implicat- 
ed.67 
This federalism focus is clear from the majority's opinion in 
NOPSI, which explained that the case was properly dismissed 
by the lower court because the dispute "so clearly involve[d] 
basic problems of Texas policy that equitable discretion should 
be exercised to give the Texas courts the first opportunity to 
60. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). 
61. Id. at  316-17. 
62. Id. at  317. 
63. Id. at  326. 
64. Id. at  333. 
65. See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968); Louisiana 
Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959). But cf. County of 
Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959) (stating that a federal court 
must exercise diversity jurisdiction if properly invoked in a state eminent domain 
case). See generally Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 US. 228, 236-38 (1943) (re- 
viewing numerous applications of abstention when federal law turns on interpreta- 
tion of local law). 
66. 491 US. 350 (1989). 
67. Id. at  361-64; see also Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 
424 U.S. 800, 814-15 (1976) (discussing the requirement that there be significant 
questions of local law or policy for Burford abstention to be appropriate). 
972 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995 
consider them? The exercise of equitable discretion would 
prevent federal-state "friction," especially, emphasized Justice 
Douglas in concurrence, friction "generated by the federal 
court's continuous and hovering presence as an additional 
policymaking player in the Texas regulatory regime."69 Justice 
Douglas noted that the Texas courts 
may at times be the senior and dominant member of [the 
federallstate court] partnership if they perform the h c t i o n s  
which Texas law places on them. The courts do not sit merely 
to enforce rights based on orders of the state administrative 
agency. They sit in judgment on that agency. That, to me, is 
the crux of the matter. If the federal courts undertook to sit 
in review, so to speak, of this state administrative agency, 
they would in effect actively participate in the fashioning of 
the state's domestic policy. That interference would be a con- 
tinuing one, as the opinion of the Court points out. Moreover, 
divided authority would result. Divided authority breeds fric- 
tion. . . .70 
As Douglas's statements indicate, the federalism concerns in 
Burford were an overriding factor in the .NOPSI decision. 
Interestingly, a recent case demonstrates the continued 
vigor, or at least the minor renaissance,?' of Burford absten- 
tion. In 1990, the Supreme Court held in TaffZin v. ~ e v i t t ? ~  
that since Congress was not unmistakably clear in subverting 
the heavy presumption of dual court sovereignty, the state 
courts have not been divested of their jurisdiction over civil 
RICO claims.73 This characterization caused the Court to con- 
clude that the federal courts are not required to hear these 
cases but may invoke Burford abstention in appropriate cas- 
e ~ . ? ~  
68. Burford, 319 US. a t  332. 
69. Id. at  335 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
70. Id. 
71. The Hart and Wechsler text points out that the "Supreme Court has not 
invoked Burford abstention since" Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern 
Railroad, 341 U.S. 341 (1951). HART & WESCHLER, supra note 5, at  1364. 
72. 493 U.S. 455 (1990). 
73. Id. at  459. 
74. Id. a t  458; see also Law Enforcement Ins. Co. v. Corcoran, 807 F.2d 38 
(2d Cir. 1986); Roy v. Verchereau, 619 I?. Supp. 1323 (D. Vt. 1985) (stating that 
labor disputes are an excellent example of local problems in which federal interven- 
tion is inappropriate). 
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3. Younger abstention 
It will be recalled that under the Anti-Injunction Act75 a 
federal court may enjoin a state court proceeding when, inter 
alia, Congress expressly permits an injunction. Additionally, 
Mitchum v. FosterT6 held that Congress intended $ 1983 ac- 
tions to be exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act, thus granting 
the federal courts the constitutional and statutory power to 
enjoin state  proceeding^.^^ It is generally in a situation such 
as this, in which the plaintiff seeks to enjoin a state proceeding 
based on the unconstitutionality of state law, that Younger 
abstention is applied.78 
In Younger v. ~ a r r i s "  the Supreme Court encountered a 
plaintiff charged under a California law which was alleged to 
be constitutionally defective?' The plaintiff sought an in- 
junction in federal court against his criminal prosecution under 
this allegedly unconstitutional law?' Although the district 
court enjoined the state proceeding, the High Court reversed, 
calling the injunction "a violation of the national policy forbid- 
ding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court pro- 
ceedings except under special ~ircumstances."~~ 
Thus, Younger abstention prevents a federal court, even in 
an effort to protect federal constitutional rights, from enjoining 
a pending state criminal proceeding. However, notwithstanding 
Younger, if there is bad faith hara~srnent,'~ such as repeated 
prosecution without any valid ground, or if a proceeding or 
statute is flagrantly and patently violative of express constitu- 
tional prohibitions," or if there are other extraordinary cir- 
cumstance~,~~ an injunction may issue. 
75. 28 U.S.C. $ 2283 (1982); see also discussion supra part II.A.l. 
76. 407 U.S. 225 (1972). 
77. Id. at  236. 
78. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 711 (1977); Doran v. Salem Inn, 
Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975); Spielman Motor Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89, 95 
(1935). 
79. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
80. Id. at  38-39. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at  41. 
83. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 350-51 (1975); Cameron v. Johnson, 
390 U.S. 611, 612 (1968); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487-89 (1965). 
84. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); 
Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53-54 
(1971). But see Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 446-47 (1977). 
85. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (holding that being held in jail 
pending trial without judicial determination of probable cause constituted an ex- 
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While Younger has its primary application in criminal 
cases, the Supreme Court has subsequently expanded the ap- 
plication of Younger's restriction against enjoining pending 
state proceedings to civil actions and administrative proceed- 
ings involving important state interests? 
Younger abstention highlights the traditional notions of 
equity, which required the court to refrain from acting if there 
existed an adequate remedy of law and if the petitioning party 
was not threatened with irreparable injuryg7 The Younger 
doctrine also "semes to prevent a multiplicity of suits where a 
single action will adequately protect the rights asserted."gg 
Possibly most importantly, this judicially-created deferral pre- 
vents federal muddling in state proceedings, thus serving the 
"vital" interests of comity and "Our Federali~rn."~~ 
In Younger, the Court highlights these two deciding fac- 
tors--comity and federalism. The Court defines "Our Federal- 
ism" in the following manner: 
[a] proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact 
that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate 
state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the 
National Government will fare best if the States and their 
institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in 
their separate ways. This, perhaps for lack of a better and 
clearer way to describe it, is referred to by many as "Our 
Federalism" . . . . 90 
The Court proceeds to explain that this concept of "Our Feder- 
alism" represents 
a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate inter- 
ests of both State and National Governments, and in which 
the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindi- 
cate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always 
traordinary circumstance); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) (finding pecuni- 
ary interest of members of Alabama Board of Optometry to be a special circum- 
stance permitting an injunction against the proceeding before the Board). 
86. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 US.  1, 12-14 (1987); Juidice v. Vail, 430 
U.S. 327, 335-36 (1977). 
87. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. 
88. Georgene M. Vairo, Interrelationship of Federal and State Litigation, C842 
ALI-ABA 1167, 1174 (1993). 
89. Id. 
90. Younger, 401 US. at 44. 
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endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with 
the legitimate activities of the  state^.^' 
The principles of comity and "Our Federalism" obviously domi- 
nate the Younger decision. 
4. Colorado River abstention 
In contrast to the federalism-promoting doctrine of equi- 
table restraint underlying Younger and Burford abstention, and 
the policy of avoiding constitutional adjudication supporting 
Pullman, the foundation of Colorado Riverg2 abstention is 
sound judicial admini~tration.'~ Colorado River Water Conser- 
vation District v. United States involved a dispute over water 
rights." The United States brought the action in federal court 
but was a defendant in a parallel state action over the same 
rights.95 The Supreme Court held that "dismissal cannot be 
supported under [the] doctrine [of abstention] in any of its 
forms" simply because there is a related and parallel action 
pending in state court.96 In ordering abstention, the Court cre- 
ated an abstention doctrine to be used under exceptional cir- 
cumstances in the interest of "[wlise judicial administra- 
t i~n . "~?  The Court enumerated the following factors to be con- 
sidered when deciding whether an exceptional circumstance ex- 
i s t ~ : ~ ~  
1) the first court to assume jurisdiction; 
2) the relative conveniences of the forums; 
3) whether there is a high desirability of avoiding piecemeal 
litigation; 
4) the manner in which jurisdiction was obtained; 
91. Id. 
92. Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). 
93. Id. at 817. 
94. Id. at  804. 
95. Id. at  806. 
96. Id. at  813; see also Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 230 (1922) 
("Each court is free to proceed in its own way and in its own time, without ref- 
erence to the proceedings in the other court."); Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U.S. 548, 
554 (1877) ("[Plendency of a prior suit is not a bar to a subsequent suit in a cir- 
cuit court or in the court below, even though the two suits are for the same cause 
of action."). 
97. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at  817 (quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-0-Two 
Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952)). 
98. Id. at 818-19 ("No one factor is necessarily determinative; a carefully 
considered judgment taking into account both the obligation to exercise jurisdiction 
and the combination of factors counseling against that exercise is required."). 
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5) the adequacy of the remedies in the respective courts;99 
6) whether federal law governs the action.loO 
Despite the exacting examination of these factors and the 
narrow construction of Colorado River by the Supreme 
Court,'" the circuit and district courts have found numerous 
"exceptional  circumstance^."''^ 
5. Propriety of the abstention doctrines 
Scholars have argued that the judicially created abstention 
doctrines are appropriate limitations on the express grants of 
federal jurisdiction on the basis of the history leading to the 
passage of such federal jurisdictional statutes.lo3 The brief 
analysis of jurisdiction-limiting statutes above1" demon- 
strates Congress' intent to recognize the background of judicial 
abstention when enacting statutes for federal deferral to state 
proceedings through restrictions on the exercise of federal juris- 
diction. As one commentator argues, the judicially created ab- 
stention doctrines are allowed, despite express grants of juris- 
diction from Congress, because 
these statutes were themselves passed against the back- 
ground of a large body of standing law on matters of sub- 
stance, remedy, and jurisdiction. . . . The fact that a given 
remedial doctrine is not explicitly mentioned therefore does 
not automatically mean that the new statute was intended 
wholly to supersede it.lo5 
Therefore, when Congress enacted the federal jurisdictional 
statutes,lo6 it  did so "against a well"lo7 of the courts' equi- 
table discretion to decline jurisdiction when certain compelling 
99. Id. 
100. This sixth factor is clearly added by Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital. v. 
Mercury Construction Co., 460 US. 1, 24 (1983). There have been additional fac- 
tors suggested by various commentators, yet the above six are those clearly used 
by the Court. See HART & WESCHLER, supra note 5, at 1451-52. 
101. See Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 US. 229, 236 (1984); Moses H. 
Cone, 460 U.S. at 2; Colorado River, 424 U.S. at  813. 
102. For an extensive sampling, see cases cited in Vairo, supra note 88, a t  
1179. 
103. See Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litiga- 
tion, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605 (1981). 
104. See discussion supra part II.A.l-3. 
105. See Bator, supra note 103, at  622 n.49. 
106. See discussion supra part II.A.l-3. 
107. To quote a colloquial phrase of Professor C. Douglas Floyd. 
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reasons for doing so were present. Congress understood that a 
grant of jurisdiction was not a mandate but rather an authori- 
zation to hear cases that would not upset the delicate balance 
of power within the dual-court system. 
Although subject to debate,lo8 commentators have argued 
that the judicially created abstention doctrines are proper exer- 
cises of judicial power since the abstention doctrines are in 
harmony with legislatively created abstentions. This conclusion 
accords with Professor Bator's view. Although disagreeing with 
this line of thinking, Professor Redish describes this view, 
which he terms the "implied delegation rationale," in the fol- 
lowing manner: 
One might argue that federal court jurisdiction . . . con- 
tains an implied authority to modifjr or limit the exercise of 
that jurisdiction in order to avoid friction within the federal 
system. Congress cannot foresee all conceivable federalism 
tensions that might arise in specific exercises of federal juris- 
diction, the argument would proceed, and therefore it is rea- 
sonable to assume that Congress would allow the federal 
courts to modify or limit their jurisdiction when they find 
such dangers. It is indeed not uncommon for Congress to 
provide broad delegations of authority to the federal judiciary 
to make law. In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, for 
example, the Supreme Court held that what seemed to be 
merely a broad jurisdictional statute vested in the federal 
courts the power to develop--wholly without congressional 
guidance-a substantive federal common law of labor rela- 
tions. Similarly, the broad language of section 1 of the 
Sherman Act has been construed as an effective delegation of 
legislative authority to the judiciary to develop a common law 
of restraint of trade. Moreover, the implied delegation argu- 
ment asserts, if Congress were unhappy with any existing 
form of partial abstention, it would legislatively revoke it. The 
failure to do so, combined with reenactment of the relevant 
substantive and jurisdictional legislation, the argument pos- 
its, reveals an implicit congressional acceptance and ratifi- 
cation of such judge-made limitations. log 
108. Compare Bator, supra note 103 and David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and 
Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985) and Michael Wells, Why Professor Redish 
is Wrong About Abstention, 19 GA. L. REV. 1097 (1985) with Thomas Merrill, The 
Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1985) and Redish, 
supra note 8. 
109. Redish, supra note 8, at 80-81. Professor Redish refers to "partial absten- 
tion" as that "abstention [which] leaves intact a portion of the jurisdictional grant" 
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Some commentators have argued that allowing the judicia- 
ry to form such buffers between the federal and state systems 
is wise. As Shapiro points out, there are compelling justifica- 
tions not only for the existence of the abstention doctrines, but 
also for allowing the judiciary to create and enforce them: 
[Sluggestions of an overriding obligation [to exercise 
jurisdiction], subject only and at most to a few narrowly 
drawn exceptions, are far too grudging in their recognition of 
judicial discretion in matters of jurisdiction. . . . [Tlhe exis- 
tence of this discretion is much more pervasive than is gener- 
ally realized, and . . . it has ancient and honorable roots a t  
common law as well as in equity. 
. . . . 
. . . My point is not that the Constitution expressly "pro- 
vides" that a grant of jurisdiction carries with it certain dis- 
cretion not to proceed, or that Congress necessarily "intends" 
to confer such discretion when it authorizes the exercise of 
jurisdiction. Rather I submit that, as experience and tradition 
teach, the question whether a court must exercise jurisdiction 
and resolve a controversy on its merits is difficult, if not im- 
possible, to answer in gross. And the courts are functionally 
better adapted to engage in the necessary fine tuning than is 
the legislature. 
. . . .  
. . . A grant of jurisdiction obligates the court to receive 
and consider the plaintiff's complaint and, on appropriate 
occasions, to determine whether the ends of justice will be 
served best by declining to proceed. 
At the same time, nothing in our history or traditions 
permits a court to interpret a normal grant of jurisdiction as 
conferring unbridled authority to hear cases simply at  its 
pleasure. . . . w h e n  jurisdiction is conferred, I believe there 
is at least a "principle of preference" that a court should en- 
tertain and resolve on its merits an action within the scope of 
the jurisdictional grant. For this preference to yield in a par- 
ticular case, the court must provide an explanation based on 
in contrast to "total abstention" which "effectively repeal[s] the statutory structure." 
Id. at 77, 74. He posits other justifications for partial abstention which are essen- 
tially variations on this implied delegation rationale. While admitting that this 
rationale is "conceivable," he rejects it and its corollaries as being "neither theoreti- 
cally legitimate nor practically realistic" as well as violative of separation-of-powers 
ideals. Id. at 78-104; see also Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967) (stating 
that when Congress granted statutory jurisdiction it also "imposed the duty upon 
all levels of the federal judiciary to give due respect to a suitor's choice of a feder- 
al forumn); Merrill, supra note 108. 
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the language of the grant, the historical context in which the 
grant was made, or the common law tradition behind it."' 
Despite deficiencies in the reasons and justifications for 
the abstention doctrines, they have been accepted by the Su- 
preme Court, at least tacitly accepted by Congress, and appear 
to be here to stay. The policies of promoting comity and federal- 
ism while avoiding friction between the federal and state judi- 
cial systems have carried the day. 
The culmination of nearly a decade of work,"' adoption 
by the American Law Institute of the Complex Litigation Rec- 
ommendation~"~ marks a vast effort to curb the unwieldiness 
of complex litigation. The Proposal "establishes new mecha- 
nisms and standards for the intra-federal, state-to-federal, 
federal-to-state, and state-to-state transfer and consolidation of 
related, yet geographically dispersed, actions, and provides a 
set of choice-of-law rules for actions that are transferred to a 
federal ~ourt.""~ 
Several areas of the Proposal may have an impact on the 
abstention doctrines as discussed above. The focus of this com- 
ment is on the powers in the Proposal that are associated with 
state-to-federal transfers and Consolidations. The primary pow- 
ers which will impact the abstention doctrines are those relat- 
ing to removal and antisuit injunctions. The anticipated impact 
rests largely on the fact that most of the cases removed, trans- 
ferred, or enjoined will be nondiverse, state law actions. 
A. Removal Jurisdiction 
To ensure the just and efficient resolution of complex cases, 
the Proposal proposes transfer and consolidation of actions in- 
volving "one or more common questions of fact."'" The 
110. Shapiro, supra note 81, a t  543-45, 574-75 (emphasis added). 
111. Professor Arthur R. Miller conducted a Preliminary Study on Complex 
Litigation in 1985, which effectively began this work, although the Reporters and 
the Advisory Committee were not appointed until 1988 and although the First 
Tentative Draft was not presented for discussion until May of 1989. See Symeon C. 
Symeonides, The ALl's Complex Litigation Project: Commencing the National De- 
bate, 54 LA. L. REV. 843, 843 (1994). 
112. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2. 
113. Symeonides, supra note 111, a t  844. 
114. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, 4 3.01(a)(l). 
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Proposal contemplates that the authority to require consolida- 
tion will be granted by Congress to a Complex Litigation Panel 
through the proposed Complex Litigation Statute. In order to 
"foster consolidation and more efficient and fair treatment of 
related claims,"115 the Complex Litigation Panel "may order 
the removal to federal court and consolidation of one or more 
civil actions pending in one or more state courts."'" Before 
such removal may occur, however, the Panel 
shall evaluate . . . (1) the criteria set forth in $ 3.01 to deter- 
mine whether the transfer and consolidation of the cases is 
warranted and (2) . . . whether removal will unduly disrupt or 
impinge upon state court or regulatory proceedings or impose 
an undue burden on the federal courts. When making its 
determination under subsections (a)(l) and (a)(2), the Com- 
plex Litigation Panel should consider factors such as 
the amount in controversy for the claims to be removed; 
the number and size of the actions involved; 
the number of jurisdictions in which the state cases are 
lodged; 
any special reasons to avoid inconsistency; 
the presence of any special local community or state 
regulatory interests; 
whether removal and consolidation will result in a 
change in the applicable law that will cause undue un- 
fairness to the parties; and 
the possibility of facilitating informal cooperation or coor- 





t o  prevent removal of the action, all of the parties as 
the state judge must agree that removal is improp- 
The federalism concerns espoused by the abstention doc- 
trines are implicated, as well as threatened, by this removal 
provision. The threat posed by the removal statute looms be- 
yond the protective reach of the abstention doctrines in an area 
where federal courts presently lack jurisdiction. Not unwisely, 
the Proposal addresses these federalism concerns squarely. The 
Proposal states that due to the "important federalism issues" 
115. Id. § 5.01 cmt. a. 
116. Id. § 5.01(a). 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 5 5.01(b). 
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raised by section 5.01, "the Panel must be especially sensitive 
to federalism concerns suggesting that removal would not be 
desirable. Removal may intrude inappropriately on the sub- 
stantive interests of the state from which the cases are re- 
moved. The states always must be respected as politically sepa- 
rate and independent  sovereign^.""^ Particularly in the face 
of the expanding federal jurisdiction proposed by the Proposal, 
these words must be heeded if the delicate state-federal bal- 
ance is to be maintained. 
While not explicitly stating so, the Proposal's comments 
espouse the concerns expressed in Burford. The Proposal urges 
that 
traditional federal respect for state sovereignty argues strong- 
ly for state control over cases arising under state law and 
respecting local citizens. . . . Similarly, if the activities or 
conduct involved fall within specific state regulatory interests 
. . . the desire to defer to the state and allow it to complete its 
proceedings without federal court interference may caution 
strongly against removal.'" 
By urging such respect, the Proposal appears to give de facto 
support to an "abstention" based on the Burford rationale: 
important state interests and policies should be left to the 
states when a state regulatory scheme is in place to review 
controversies involving such interests. In fact, the Proposal's 
endorsement of Burford abstention appears clear from the lan- 
guage of section 5.01(a)(2), which requires the Panel to evalu- 
ate "whether removal will unduly disrupt or impinge upon 
state court or regulatory proceedings.""' 
The Proposal also attempts to force state court filings when 
the majority of the related actions have been filed in parallel 
state  proceeding^.'^^ This is to be accomplished by a stay of 
the federal court proceedings until the completion of the state 
court proceedings.'" The stay naturally "will have the effect 
of coercing the federal parties to file in state court."124 Thus, 
federalism concerns may be further alleviated. 
119. Id. § 5.01 cmt. c. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 8 5.01(a)(2). 
122. Id. 8 5.01 cmt. c. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
982 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995 
B. Reverse Removal 
Mention must be made of an entirely new procedure partly 
designed to 'avoid the threats to federalism generated "[wlhen 
substantive state interests are at  issue" and "all the actions 
regardless of where they were filed [are forced] into a consoli- 
dated federal court action."125 The procedure contemplates a 
federal-to-state transfer mechanism through the enactment of a 
federal statute and state-to-state transfer through an interstate 
compact or uniform act. 126 
This reverse removal will occur only under very limited 
circumstances and only after the requirements for federal 
transfer are satisfied as a threshold matter.127 Many federal- 
ism concerns raised by these state transfer mechanisms, in- 
cluding concerns about federal imposition on state judicial 
independence and overburdening of state dockets, may be alle- 
viated by the fact that the consent of the appropriate state judi- 
cial authority must be obtained prior to cons~lidation.'~~ 
The state transfer section of the Proposal will provide an 
opportunity for actions with overwhelming state issues, inter- 
ests, and litigants to have their day in state court. Because the 
factors allowing for state court consolidation are so demanding, 
however, consolidation in a state court will occur in only a 
small number of cases, cases in which state issues predomi- 
nate. Thus, federalism interests will be protected by the state 
transfer section only in relatively few cases. Also, however 
apparent the appeasement of federalism policies may appear in 
the state transfer provision, the provision's overriding aim "is 
to increase the ability to promote efficient aggregated proceed- 
ings ."I2' 
The demanding nature of the factors in the state transfer 
section are too high to permit the substantive and quantitative 
results necessary to protect the principles of federalism. As the 
principles of federalism underlying the abstention doctrines are 
eroded by the Proposal, even in a piecemeal fashion, the threat 
to the abstention doctrines increases. 
125. Id. Ch. 4 Intro. Note cmt. b. 
126. Id. crnt. a. 
127. See id. 8 4.01. 
128. Id. 8 4.01(a), cmt. b.; Ch. 4 Intro. Note cmt. d. 
129. Id. Ch. 4 Intro. Note cmt. a. 
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C. Antisuit Injunctions 
Another aspect of the power to consolidate actions is the 
ability to enjoin related proceedings in other courts. This power 
is found in section 5.04, Antisuit Injunctions: 
(a) When actions are transferred and consolidated pur- 
suant to 5 3.01 or 5 5.01, the transferee court may 
enjoin transactionally related proceedings, or por- 
tions thereof, pending in any state or federal court 
whenever it determines that the continuation of 
those actions substantially impairs or interferes 
with the consolidated actions and that an injunction 
would promote the just, efficient, and fair resolution 
of the actions before it. 
(b) Factors to  be considered in deciding whether an in- 
junction should issue under subsection (a) include 
(1) how far the actions to be enjoined have pro- 
gressed; 
(2) the degree to which the actions to be enjoined 
share common questions with and are 
duplicative of the consolidated actions; 
(3) the extent to which the actions to be enjoined 
involve issues or claims of federal law; and 
(4) whether parties to the action to be enjoined 
were permitted to exclude themselves from the 
consolidated proceeding under 5 3 .O5(a) or 
5 5.01(b).130 
This injunctive power is a necessary and logical aspect of 
the efficiency theme permeating the Proposal. The power is a 
crucial component of the broad managerial powers granted to 
the transferee judge to further the objective of achieving a just, 
efficient, and fair adjudication of the dispute.131 Without the 
power to enjoin related proceedings the transferee court would 
be fettered with peripheral matters hindering the advancement 
of the consolidated actions. 
The Proposal recognizes the serious federalism concerns 
raised by the injunctive power.'" In addressing these con- 
cerns, the Proposal initially focuses on the fact that the legisla- 
tive body will confer the power to enjoin state proceedings and 
that the first exception of the Anti-Injunction Act allows such 
130. Id. 8 5.04. 
131. Id. 8 3.06. 
132. Id. 8 5.04 cmt. c. 
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injunctions based on express congressional auth~rization. '~~ 
Thus, the Proposal implies that the proposed federal injunctive 
power is consistent with, and does not upset, the current feder- 
al-state balance struck by the legislature in the Anti-Injunction 
Act. With the passage of the Complex Litigation Statute, the 
doorway will be opened for injunctions of state court proceed- 
ings because of the express exception it contains. 
In apparent deference to federalism concerns, the Proposal 
also suggests that the injunction, if issued, "should be as nar- 
row as p~ssible."'~~ The Proposal emphasizes state interests, 
declaring that "[b]ecause of the serious intrusion caused by an 
antisuit injunction both on party interests and, when state 
court litigation is involved, on state interests, the scope of the 
injunction must be limited to what is necessary to meet the 
standards of 5 5.04(a)."'~~ A narrow injunction, such as one 
focusing only on discovery, for example, may be appropriate 
where "[aln injunction against all activity in the related action 
would not be ~ a r r a n t e d . " ' ~ ~  In narrowing the injunction in 
this manner, the Proposal contends that the purposes of the 
Proposal will be advanced without damaging federalism 
in te res t~ . '~~  
In this same vein, the Proposal urges that "because an in- 
junction sometimes will implicate sensitive issues of state sov- 
ereignty, and always will impinge on the parties' abilities to 
control their litigation, it should not issue unless the fullest 
due process safeguards have been provided."138 According to 
the Proposal, these due process safeguards, such as "a detailed 
factual inquiry and a full opportunity for all affected parties to 
be heard,"13' will ensure the recognition and consideration of 
federalism issues before the injunction is issued. 
133. 28 U.S.C. 5 2283 (1982); see also discussion supra part II.A.l. 






DEATH OF A DOCTRINE? 
IV. THE COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT AND THE 
ABSTENTION DOCTRINES: A FORKED TONGUE-THE DUAL 
TREATMENT REVEALED 
In harmony with their expressed concern over federalism, 
the Proposal mentions the importance of the abstention doc- 
trines. The Proposal addresses the abstention doctrines with 
particularity in comment d of section 5.01: 
The expansion of federal removal jurisdiction under 
5 5.01 to accommodate complex cases also is tailored to take 
account of general federalism concerns. Historically, as a 
matter of comity and federalism, federal courts have declined 
to exercise jurisdiction over certain cases deemed more appro- 
priate for state court adjudication. Although the scope of 
abstention doctrines is uncertain, it generally reflects an 
exercise of judicial self-restraint motivated by a desire to 
avoid undue intrusion in matters properly within state com- 
petence. However, when Congress explicitly grants removal 
jurisdiction in order to provide an economical and fair forum 
for multiparty, multiforum disputes, it expresses a federal 
interest in these cases. To the extent that this expansion of 
removal jurisdiction might be viewed as undermining the 
states' traditional role in defining their own substantive 
law-particularly tort law-that prerogative is not constitu- 
tionally immune. Removal under this section fits within the 
scope of Article I11 jurisdiction and also may be justified as  an 
exercise of Congress's Article I interstate commerce pow- 
ers.140 
Ultimately, especially when combined with other passages of 
the proposal, this paragraph sends a dual message that under- 
mines the ideals of federalism found in the abstention doc- 
trines. 
A. State versus Federal Interests 
The paragraph quoted above begins by stating that section 
5.01 has been "tailored to take account of general federalism 
~oncerns."'~' This is in harmony with the lipservice of com- 
ment c and the first several paragraphs of comment d. Then a 
"however" creeps into the paragraph, followed by justifications 
that overshadow the earlier language and message. In essence, 
140. Id. $ 5.01 cmt. d. 
141. Id. 
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the Proposal contends that a matter is no longer of state inter- 
est when Congress deems the matter within its own interests. 
The judicially created abstention doctrines completely rekte 
this assertion by refusing to exercise jurisdiction over matters 
that Congress has expressly placed within the jurisdiction of 
the federal courts. The Proposal strongly implies that once the 
Complex Litigation Statute is enacted by Congress the federal- 
ism concerns and the policies underlying the abstention doc- 
trines fade to the background. 
Further seeking to stifle federalism concerns, comment d 
continues by stating that such concerns "act as an important 
element in deciding whether a particular grouping of cases 
could be handled better in the federal or the state courts," but 
they are "not an absolute barrier."142 It is doubtful that feder- 
alism concerns or the abstention doctrines would ever be 
viewed as an absolute barrier. However, when treated as mere 
factors by a proposal which also tries to emphasize their impor- 
tance, federalism principles are ultimately undermined. As 
seen below, the placating words ring hollow when the proce- 
dures for application are proposed. 
B. Federalism on a PedestallFederalism in a Slough: The 
Dualistic Treatment of the Abstention Doctrines 
The abstention doctrines are heralded in one breath by the 
Proposal and then subverted in the next. The heralding of fed- 
eralism principles can also be seen in the treatment of the 
abstention doctrines in relation to the antisuit injunctions. 
Subsection (b)(3) of section 5.04 deals with the federalism con- 
cerns directly, stating that the court should consider "the ex- 
tent to which the actions to be enjoined involve issues or claims 
of federal law."143 
The abstention doctrines are particularly addressed in the 
comment on the discretionary factors listed above under section 
5.04(b)(l)-(4).lM The comment to this section requires "the 
transferee judge to consider whether the actions to be enjoined 
involve issues or claims of federal law."145 The comment 
emphasizes the importance of federalism, specifically mention- 
142. Id. § 5.01 cmt. d. 
143. Id. 5 5.04(b)(3). 
144. See supra text accompanying note 130. 
145. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2,  8 5.04 cmt. d. 
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ing the embodiment of federalism concerns in the abstention 
doctrines: 
A transferee judge deciding to enjoin state litigation involving 
predominantly state issues must respect traditional notions of 
federalism, especially as reflected in the various abstention 
doctrines. See Comment c, Reporter's Note 9. Although some 
federal intrusion on state court proceedings may be necessary 
to effectuate a solution to the complex litigation problem, 
great care must be taken to preserve the federal-state balance 
of power. Before deciding to enjoin a state court proceeding, a 
federal transferee judge must weigh the benefits of aggrega- 
tion against the potential intrusion on state sovereignty. The 
greater the significance of the federal claims or issues in- 
volved in the action to be enjoined, the more reasonable it will 
be to issue the injunction because it would not be unduly 
intrusive on legitimate state interests. Any intrusiveness 
would be on the litigation and party interests, which should 
not be overlooked, but are evaluated under subsections (b)(l) 
and (b)(4). Conversely, if a case is dominated by state-based 
claims or issues, enjoining their prosecution in a state court 
should require a strong finding that the benefits of consolida- 
tion in the transferee court would be undermined by allowing 
that state suit to continue unimpeded. This might be true, for 
example, if the court found that a particular state action 
essentially was parallel to one of those in the consolidated 
proceeding or that the plaintiffs had filed it after the Complex 
Litigation Panel had issued its order to transfer and consoli- 
date in an effort to engage in a race to judgment or to avoid 
the governing law chosen under the applicable federal choice 
of law standards. See generally Chapter 6.  In the latter event, 
an injunction may be necessary to ensure the consistent ap- 
plication of the law chosen by the transferee court.146 
This aspect of the comment dealing specifically with feder- 
alism concerns appears to placate any fears one may have 
regarding the disregard or dismissal of such concerns. The 
Proposal compels the transferee judge to "respect traditional 
notions of federalism"; the judge "must" do so.147 The 
Proposal demands, with particularity, that the judge examine 
these "traditional notions of federalism . . . as reflected in the 
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"some federal intrusion" may be required to solve the complex 
litigation problem, "great care must be taken" to uphold the 
delicate federal-state balance of power. 14' The scales are to 
weigh "the benefits of aggregation" on the one side, "potential 
intrusion on state sovereignty" on the other.'" The transferee 
judge is told that in a case "dominated by state-based claims or 
issues, . . . a strong finding" is "require[d]" that "the benefits of 
consolidation in the transferee court would be undermined by 
allowing that state suit to continue unimpeded" before enjoin- 
ing its prosecution in the state court. Taken in isolation, this 
paragraph of comment d would go far to alleviate the concerns 
over the Proposal's treatment of federalism concerns embodied 
in the abstention doctrines. 
However, when read in conjunction with other language of 
the Proposal, with other treatment of the abstention doctrines, 
and with the dominating theme of the Proposal, an entirely 
different impression emerges: the "efficiency" card trumps all 
others, including the abstention card of the federalism suit. 
Under this efficiency dominated impression, the Panel and the 
transferee judge will play their hands. 
For example, the Proposal does not pause for a moment be- 
fore dismissing the federalism concerns raised by creating an- 
other exception to the general prohibition against federal in- 
junctions of state ac t ion~ . '~~  The message to Congress, and 
indirectly to the Panel and transferee judge, is that "[tlhe fed- 
eralism concerns articulated in various abstention doctrines are 
merely prudential. They are binding on the courts by operation 
of stare decisis, but they do not delimit Congress's ability to 
regulate the federal courts."'52 This wording discourages the 
use of the abstention doctrines and is in great contrast to the 
mandatory-sounding language used above requiring the exami- 
nation of and heed to the abstention doctrines. The 
Recommendaitons' inconsistent treatment of the abstention 
doctrines sends a mixed message to the transferee judge, with 
the ultimate effect of down-playing the importance of the ab- 
stention doctrines and federalism concerns in general. "One 
cannot but see such ambivalence as de-emphasizing the legiti- 
mate federalism-based role of abstention while stressing the 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. $ 5.04. 
152. Id. $ 5.04 cmt. c (emphasis added). 
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virtually unchecked exercise of discretion to issue injunctive 
orders. 
C. Dismissal of Traditional State Respect 
A larger problem becomes evident &om such cursory treat- 
ment of the federalism concerns embodied in the abstention 
doctrines: the lack of respect given by the Proposal to state 
sovereignty. Congress, and arguably the federal courts, have 
traditionally respected state sovereignty to a much greater 
degree than the Proposal does. The Anti-Injunction Act, the 
Tax Injunction Act, and the Johnson Act are examples of con- 
gressional attempts to limit federal court power and jurisdic- 
tion in order to prevent serious infringement on state sover- 
eignty. These and other acts of Congress indicate that the ab- 
stention policies are not only a matter of judicial, but also of 
legislative, concern. 
The legislative respect of state sovereignty has been f i r -  
thered by the federal courts through narrow constructions of 
the exceptions to these statutes1" and through the restraints 
found in the abstention doctrines. When congressional and judi- 
cial respect for state sovereignty are juxtaposed with the re- 
spect espoused by the Proposal, the latter pales in comparison. 
By emphasizing the "merely prudential" aspect of the ab- 
stention doctrines over the federalism concerns underlying the 
doctrines, the Proposal seeks to justify their override of the 
Anti-Injunction Act. lS5 They "press" the abstention theory in- 
to a new mold while simultaneously giving lip-service to the 
federalism concerns underlying the statute.156 Turning ab- 
stention theory "on its head," the Proposal uses it "to serve the 
ends of federalized, consolidated  proceeding^."'^^ Professor 
153. Edward Brunet, The Triumph of Efficiency and Discretion Over Competing 
Complex Litigation Policies, 10 REV. LITIG. 273, 290 (1991). 
154. California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 413 (1982) (stating 
that the "exception" to the Tax Injunction Act should be narrowly construed); 
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 228-29 (1972) (holding, along with Atlantic Coast 
Line, that the Anti-Injunction Act's ban is absolute unless the case falls within one 
of the three express exceptions); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Loco- 
motive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286-87 (1970); Stanislaus Food Prods. Co. v. Public 
Util. Comm'n, 560 F. Supp. 114 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (finding no exception to the John- 
son Act for suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
155. Linda S. Mullenix, Complex Litigation Reform and Article III Jurisdiction, 
59 FORDHAM L. REV. 169, 213 (1990). 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
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Mullenix is very critical of this twist on the abstention doc- 
trines and their underlying policies: 
Thus, the reformers use abstention theory, which has 
traditionally been interpreted to permit federal court abdica- 
tion of jurisdiction in favor of parallel state court proceedings, 
to justifj. the denial of state court jurisdiction over complex 
cases. Rather than using abstention doctrine to restrict the 
exercise of federal jurisdiction, the reformers press abstention 
theory into service to expand federal jurisdiction. This is re- 
verse mandatory abstention, and how this serves the ends of 
federalism and comity is unclear.158 
D. Efficiency Trumps Federalism 
By treating the abstention doctrines as "merely prudential" 
and thus moving away from federalism, the Proposal joins 
voices with those advocating efficiency over federalism.lsg 
Judge Weinstein's voice is heard in the injunctions preventing 
all federal and state litigation against two asbestos producers 
in In re Joint Eastern and Southern Districts Asbestos 
LitigationlGO and In re Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc.161 Judge 
Weinstein's decision in enjoining these actions "illustrates how 
the interests of judicial administration can overwhelm compet- 
ing policies in a balancing test."lG2 Such an efficiency empha- 
sis occurs throughout the Proposal and most definitely appears 
to weigh more heavily in the balance than do other policies and 
considerations. lG3 
The efficiency trend also carries over into the choice of law 
provisions of the Proposal with the same effect of giving lip 
158. Id. 
159. Some have resigned themselves to this trend as a necessary evil. See 
Herbert P. Wilkins, The ALJ's Complex Litigation Project: A State Judge's View, 54 
LA. L. REV. 1155, 1158 (1994) (stating that "[als a state judge, I have no problem 
with the fact that the operation of the proposed system will result in cases being 
taken away fiom state court jurisdiction on a standard of freer mobility . . . . That 
will be the inevitable and necessary consequence of the efficient transfer and con- 
solidation of cases by the complex litigation panel"). 
160. 120 B.R. 648 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
161. 134 F.R.D. 32 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
162. Brunet, supra note 153, a t  289. 
163. See id. a t  290-97 (discussing "recent clashes between efficiency and fair- 
ness-premised policies [which] have frequently advanced efficiency while merely 
accommodating or clearly subordinating fairness"); see also COMPLEX LITIGATION 
PROPOSAL, supra note 2, 8 5.01 cmt. d (employing a circular argument justifying 
intrusion on parties' rights based on an earlier aspect of the Proposal). 
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service to state interests while in reality undermining those 
interests. In the introduction to chapter six, the Proposal states 
that there were two important considerations weighed in decid- 
ing "what choice of law system would be most compatible with 
the objectives" of the Proposal? These considerations were 
"whether there is sufficient justification to change the current 
reliance on state choice of law rules, since any adoption of a 
federal statutory choice of law code for complex litigation nec- 
essarily will intrude on what has been an area governed by 
state law" and 
[ilf a federal statutory approach is thought desirable, . . . 
whether that approach simply should authorize the federal 
courts to develop federal common law in the area . . . or 
whether more precise rules ought to be provided giving great- 
er guidance to the judiciary concerning how to select among 
competing state interests in providing the controlling legal 
principles. 16' 
The Proposal predictably chose to "intrude on what has 
been an area governed by state law" and authorize federally 
mandated choice of law? One commentator feels that this is 
simply "another assault on state sovereignty": 
State sovereignty is a fbndamental element of the Ameri- 
can constitutional system. The ability of each state to apply 
its own law in private litigation where it has a real interest 
in doing so in order to implement the policy reflected in that 
law is an important attribute of state sovereignty. The regard 
for state sovereignty, that is so fundamental in our constitu- 
tional system and that has been so long recognized by Con- 
gress, strongly argues against denying the states the power to 
apply their own law to advance their own policies and inter- 
ests, notwithstanding that a mass tort is inv~lved.'~' 
After taking this first step of authorizing a federal choice 
of law rule, the Proposal attempts to soften the blow through 
"ritual incantations" to the states concerning their rights. The 
blow is further softened through articulated, but of little ap- 
164. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, Ch. 6 Intro. Note. 
165. Id. 
166. Id.; see id. $8 6.01, 6.03. 
167. Robert A. Sedler, The Complex Litigation Project's Proposal for Federally- 
Mandated Choice of Law in Mass Torts Cases: Another Assault on State Sovereign- 
ty, 54 LA. L. REV. 1085, 1110 (1994). 
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parent sincerity, federalism concerns which prevent the Propos- 
al from allowing the federal courts to develop their own federal 
common law in the area due to "states' rights,"'68 federalism 
"con~erns"'~~ and  restraint^,"'^^ "state  interest^,"'^' and 
the existence of a "vigorous body of state law."172 While the 
Proposal dismisses the choice of law rules established by the 
states, they at  least permit the application of state substantive 
law.lT3 This may be the only "real" triumph for federalism. 
Once again, conflicting signals are expressed as lip-service is 
given to federalism while state choice of law rules are thrown 
out the window. The ultimate result is undermining federalism 
and, necessarily, the policies underlying the abstention doc- 
trines. 
The abstention doctrines were created in a dual system of 
judiciaries in an effort to prevent friction. They were also treat- 
ed in harmony with statutes demanding federal deferral to 
state courts and against the federal courts' well-established 
equitable discretion to decline jurisdiction when certain compel- 
ling reasons for doing so are present. Although Congress has 
created exceptions to these statutes, they have been few in 
number and narrowly construed by the courts. This indicates 
the importance of the comity and respect due the state system 
from the federal system as well as the importance of reducing 
friction between the two systems. 
The abstent ion doctrines have expanded th i s  
congressionally created deference to state courts for several 
reasons. Pullman abstention seeks not only to avoid federal 
constitutional issues but also to allow the state courts to settle 
uncertainties of state laws. The Court justified Pullman's re- 
straint of federal authority "because of 'scrupulous regard for 
the rightful independence of the state governments' and for the 
smooth working of the federal judiciary" by avoiding friction 
with the state judiciary.'74 Burford abstention seeks to allow 
COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, Ch. 6 Intro. Note, cmt. c. 
Id. Q 6.01, Reporter's Note 4 to cmt. a. 
Id. Q 6.01, cmt. c. 
Id. 
Id. Ch. 6, Intro. Note, Reporter's Note 4 to cmt. b; see Friedrich K. 
The Complex Litigation Project's Tort Choice-of-Law Rules, 54 LA. L. REV. 
(1994). 
Id. Q §  6.01(a), 6.03(a). 
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (citations omit- 
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the state courts to handle issues involving important local in- 
terests when the states have a scheme of public administration 
in place to deal with these interests. Younger abstention often 
applies to prevent enjoining state proceedings, even when Con- 
gress expressly permits an injunction. This type of Younger ab- 
stention highlights the traditional notions of equity in the vital 
interests of comity and "Our Federalism." Colorado River ab- 
stention requires deference to state courts when exceptional 
circumstances exist that make abstention administratively 
wise. 
The interests underlying the abstention doctrines obviously 
play an important role in maintaining the delicate balance 
between federal and state judiciaries. The Proposal appears to 
understand the important roles these policies have played in 
our nation's jurisprudence, for the Proposal pays token homage 
to these principles. The Proposal employs all the right 
catchphrases when entering areas which may raise federalism 
concerns, especially those areas espoused by the abstention 
doctrines. The Proposal begins by stating that "every attempt 
has been made to ensure that the proposals recommended by 
the Project are consistent with . . . [the] basic principles of 
federalism and their implications as to the respective roles of 
state and federal courts."175 The Proposal mandates "respect 
[for] traditional notions of federalism, especially as reflected in 
the various abstention doctrines" and attention to "the fullest 
due process safeguards" before issuing an antisuit injunc- 
tion.'" If the transferee judge decides that an injunction 
should issue, "great care must be taken" not to offend the bal- 
ance of federal-state power and a "strong finding" is "re- 
quire[dIn that an injunction is necessary to prevent an under- 
mining of the consolidated a~ti0ns.l '~ Similar pro-federalism 
language is employed when dismissing the prospect of allowing 
the federal courts to create common law choice of law rules: 
"states' rights,"17' federalism "concerns"17g and "re- 
ted). 
175. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, Ch. 1, Intro. Note. 
176. Id. $ 5.04. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. Ch. 6, Intro. Note, cmt. c. 
179. Id. $ 6.01, Reporter's Note 4 to cmt. a. 
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s t ra in t~ , " '~~  "state interests,"lal and the existence of a "vigor- 
ous body of state law."lg2 
The lessons intended by Arthur Miller the playwright ap- 
pear to be lost on Arthur Miller the law professor. Like Willy 
Loman, the Proposal simultaneously speaks words of contradic- 
tion. The above "ritual  incantation^,"'^^ intended to assuage, 
fail to truly protect federalist principles when viewed with 
other language addressing federalism in general and the ab- 
stention doctrines in particular. For example, the abstention 
doctrines are summarily dismissed as "merely prudential" in 
the context of Congress's ability to regulate the federal courts; 
they are not immune from constitutional and congressional 
attacks, nor are they an "absolute barrier" to congressional 
action. This treatment of the abstention doctrines undermines 
the policies behind the existing federal abstention statutes, the 
equitable constraints pre-dating those statutes, and the impor- 
tant comity and federalism issues underlying the judicial ab- 
stention doctrines. 
The message sent to the Complex Litigation Panel regard- 
ing traditional federalism policies is mixed, yet the substantive 
emphasis is placed upon efficiency with the federalism policies 
being relegated to the position of secondary considerations. 
Acting upon the Proposal's emphasis, the Panel will likely 
consolidate and transfer many actions which have traditionally 
been left to the states. Additionally, the transferee judge will 
likely follow the Panel's lead and more freely issue antisuit 
injunctions. As the lubricating policies underlying the absten- 
tion doctrines are drained away, the friction so often mentioned 
in the abstention cases between the federal and state systems 
is bound to follow. 
Under the Proposal, then, federalism principles are a casu- 
alty to the overriding goal of efficiency.'" The price to be paid 
by the abstention doctrines, and in reality by the states, will be 
great if the Complex Litigation Statute is adopted. Concerns 
over manageability and economy, in the name of efficiency, will 
outweigh historic federalism concerns. With the minimization 
180. Id. $ 6.01, cmt. c. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. Ch. 6, Intro. Note, Reporter's Note 4 to cmt. b. 
183. Juenger, supra note 172, at 922. 
184. For other such casualties, such as party autonomy, party interests, and 
choice of forum (to name but a few), see Brunet, supra note 153. 
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of state interests, the delicate federal-state balance is dis- 
rupted, and the abstention doctrines are in danger of becoming 
relics of the past. These developments will likely first occur in 
the area of complex litigation, and then as courts create analo- 
gies to the complex litigation area, they may slowly move away 
from the "merely prudential" abstention doctrines in areas 
where the doctrines have traditionally held sway. 
Of course, this may be too ominous a prediction. Federal 
judges who value state rights and "Our Federalism" may heed 
what this comment has characterized as the Proposal's "ritual 
incantations." These judges may very well take great care to 
preserve the delicate federal-state balance. Especially in the 
area of removal jurisdiction, the Complex Litigation Panel may 
focus on the language highlighting federalism concerns and the 
abstention doctrines, resulting in many cases being adjudicated 
by state courts. Burford abstention in particular may thrive in 
cases involving the Recomrnendaitons' removal jurisdiction. 
There may even be a new form of abstention developed by the 
Court in this complex litigation area. 
While all the ripples from the Proposal's stone are yet to be 
seen and felt, caution must be exercised to avoid friction be- 
tween our two judicial systems. A developing pattern of valuing 
efficiency while subverting federalism appears to be a warning 
signal. Before adopting the Proposal's, careful thought and 
examination must be devoted to ensure that the ripples do not 
become waves eroding the historic shores of the abstention 
doctrines on the continent of "Our Federalism." 
William A. Calhoun II 
